Detention of Aliens by Schmidt, Paul Wickham
San Diego Law Review 
Volume 24 
Issue 2 Immigration and Nationality XII Article 4 
3-1-1987 
Detention of Aliens 
Paul Wickham Schmidt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the Immigration Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul W. Schmidt, Detention of Aliens, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 305 (1987). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol24/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, 
please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 
Detention of Aliens
PAUL WICKHAM SCHMIDT*
Detention of aliens has become a controversial issue in the debate
over immigration policy. This Article examines general principles
relating to detention of aliens in exclusion and deportation situa-
tions. It also surveys the legal issues in noteworthy areas of the
detention controversy. Finally, the Article explores how the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service can most effectively utilize de-
tention in the future.
INTRODUCTION
The authority to arrest and detain aliens for civil law violations
makes the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) unique
among federal law enforcement agencies. While a number of federal
agencies have the authority to impose various civil penalties upon
individuals, such as fines, forfeitures, and loss of licenses, the INS
stands alone in its authority to incarcerate individuals who neither
have been charged with, nor have been convicted of, crimes. It is not
surprising that the use of this authority by the INS has become the
subject of controversy and a substantial amount of litigation. Never-
theless, the authority of the government to detain aliens in connec-
tion with the enforcement of the immigration laws is well estab-
* Acting General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service, United
States Department of Justice. B.A. 1970, Lawrence University; J.D. 1973, University of
Wisconsin Law School. Mr. Schmidt has been the Deputy General Counsel since 1978,
and also has served as the Acting General Counsel of the INS during the period 1979-
1981. Prior to joining the INS in 1976, Mr. Schmidt served as an attorney adviser with
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
This Article is an expansion and elaboration upon remarks made by Mr. Schmidt
before the Center for Migration Studies in Washington, D.C. on March 21, 1986. The
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lished, 1 and predates the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA).2
The use of detention has varied over the years. At one time, most
immigrants, legal and illegal, arrived from Europe by boat at a lim-
ited number of major seaports.3 Detention for "screening and deter-
mination of admissibility to the United States was the norm."'4
In the years following World War II, the source of immigration
shifted to the Western Hemisphere and Asia. Airports and land bor-
ders replaced seaports as the principal places of arrival.5 During
these years, the use of detention also declined.' Ellis Island, where
once the majority of all aliens arriving in the United States were
detained for inspection, was closed in 1954. A policy was announced
of "paroling" potentially inadmissible aliens into the United States,
unless they appeared likely to abscond.7
With recent increases in illegal immigration 8 and well-publicized
incidents such as the Cuban flotilla of 1980 illustrating the vulnera-
bility of our borders, the government has had to resort to detention
in an increasing number of cases. Detention raises a number of re-
lated issues, such as the location of detention facilities, access to
counsel, use of nonfederal and nongovernmental facilities, conditions
of confinement, length of detention, detention of asylum applicants,
detention of minors, no-work bond conditions, use of detainers, andjudicial review." This Article addresses these issues.
1. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 8, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085 (1891). For
a general discussion of immigration and the history of the Ellis Island immigration sta-tion, see Barry, Isle of Hope, Isle of Tears, INS Reporter, at 7 (Spring 1986).2. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982) [hereinafterINA]. The INA was amended in 1980 by the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212,94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified at INA §§ 101(a)(42), 207-209, 243(b), 411-414, 8 U.S.C.§§ 1101(a)(42), 1157-1 159, 1253(h), 1521-1524). For further discussion, see infra notes
139-66.
3. Barry, supra note 1, at 7-8.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 10-13.
6. Id. at 10-11.
7. Id. at 11. This change in the policy applicable to arriving aliens was describedby Justice Clark as reflecting "the humane qualities of an enlightened civilization." Leng
May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958).8. Apprehensions of illegal aliens have increased from 910,361 in fiscal year1980, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY SERVICE, 1985 STATIsTI-
CAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 176 (1986), to a
record 1,770,000 in fiscal year 1986, U.S. Dept of Justice, Press Release, Sept. 29, 1986.The latter figure represents an increase of approximately one-third over the previous rec-
ord set in fiscal year 1985. However, INS border apprehensions have dropped signifi-
cantly, by as much as 50% in some key areas, following the November 6, 1986 enact-
ment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100Stat. 3359 (1987) [hereinafter IRCA]. See Fewer Illegal Aliens Trying to Cross Over,
May 9, 1987, at A3, col. 5.
9. For a report critical of current immigration detention policies, see LAWYERS
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS/HELSINKI WATCH, MOTHER OF EXILES (1986).
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DETENTION OF ALIENS
Deportable Aliens
A deportable alien is one who has "entered" the United States,
and either has entered illegally or has committed some type of mis-
conduct prohibited by the immigration laws following entry. The
INA authorizes the Attorney General to take aliens into custody
pending deportation proceedings to be conducted before an immigra-
tion judge.10 Pending the determination of deportability, the Attor-
ney General may continue to detain the alien without bond, release
the alien on a bond of not less than 500 dollars, or conditionally
release the alien on his own recognizance."1
The authority of the Attorney General to detain aliens has been
delegated to district directors and other comparable officials of the
INS. 2 A custody determination then is made by the district director
or other official at the time a warrant is issued.13
An alien who is dissatisfied with the custody determination made
by the district director may apply to that official for release or ame-
lioration of the conditions of custody. 4 The alien also may request a
de novo determination of custody and bond by an immigration
judge.1 5 Immigration judges are quasi-judicial officers who are inde-
pendent from the INS. They serve under the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR), a separate branch of the Department
of Justice.16 In connection with a bond redetermination, an immigra-
tion judge exercises the same authority as can a district director to
detain, release, or set bond. 7
An appeal from the immigration judge's decision may be taken to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) by either the alien or the
INS. 8 The Board is a quasi-judicial body which also is part of the
EOIR.19 In certain situations, a direct appeal can be taken to the
10. INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
11. Id.
12. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 (a) (1986).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. § 242.2(b).
16. Id. §§ 3.9, 3.10 (1986). The term "immigration judge" is by regulation inter-
changeable with the statutory term "special inquiry officer." See INA §§ 101(b)(4),
242(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(4), 1252(b); 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(1) (1986).
17. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(b).
18. Id. §§ 3.1(b)(7), 242.2(b). The taking of an appeal does not delay compliance
with the custody order. Id. § 242.2(b).
19. Id. § 3.1(a).
Board from the custody determination of a district director, thus
bypassing the immigration judge.20
The standards for detaining aliens pending deportation proceed-
ings are related to those set forth in decisions of the Board that are
binding on the INS.21 The Board has stated that in a deportation
context "[a]n alien generally is not and should not be detained or
required to post bond except on a finding that he is a threat to the
national security . . . or that he is a poor bail risk . . ,, . A "poor
bail risk" generally characterizes an alien who is likely to abscond.23
The authority to detain an alien continues after an order of depor-
tation is issued. The law permits the Attorney General to maintain
custody of a deportable alien for a period of up to six months follow-
ing the entry of a final order of deportation so as to effect that or-
der.24 This has been construed as permitting the Attorney General
six "unhampered" months to achieve deportation.25 Therefore, this
does not include periods when the deportation was prevented by
court actions filed by the alien, or when the deportation was pre-
vented by the alien's failure to surrender.28
The law specifically provides that judicial review and revision of
an alien's custody pending deportation proceedings may be had
"upon a conclusive showing in habeas corpus proceedings that the
20. Id. § 242.2(b). For discussions of how these jurisdictional provisions are ap-
plied, see In re Vea, 18 I. & N. Dec. 171 (BIA 1981); In re Sio, 18 I. & N. Dec. 176(BIA 1981); In re Chew, 18 I. & N. Dec. 262 (BIA 1982).
21. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g).
22. In re Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666 (BIA 1976); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524 (1952), reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 985 (1952) (discussing the Attorney General's
authority to detain aliens on national security grounds). In considering whether an alien
presents a national security risk, the immigration judge and the Board may consider
classified information which is not made available to the alien or his counsel. United
States ex rel. Barbour v. District Director, 491 F.2d 573 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974).
23. See In re S-Y-L, 9 1. & N. Dec. 575, 577 (BIA 1962).
24. INA § 242(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c). The more logical view appears to be that
this section applies following a final administrative order of deportation. United States ex
rel. Ceflau v. Shaughnessy, 117 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on opinion below, 209
F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1954). However, the District of Columbia Circuit has found section
242(c) to be inapplicable during a period of judicial review of a final administrative order
of deportation; instead, the District of Columbia Circuit indicates that detention during
such period should be premised on INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Rubinstein v.
Brownell, 206 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1953), affd per curiam by an equally divided court,
346 U.S. 929 (1954). One court has found that detention during such period can be
sustained under both section 242(a) and section 242(c). Bartholomeu v. District Direc-
tor, 487 F. Supp. 315, 321 (D. Md. 1980).
25. United States ex rel. Ceflau v. Shaughnessy, 117 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd on opinion below, 209 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1954); Bartholomeu v. District Director,
487 F. Supp. 315 (D. Md. 1980).
26. United States ex rel. Ceflau v. Shaughnessy, 117 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y.),
aft'd on opinion below, 209 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1954); United States ex rel. Lam Tuk
Man v. Esperdy, 280 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Bartholomeu v. District Director,
487 F. Supp. 315 (D. Md. 1980).
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Attorney General is not proceeding with such reasonable dispatch as
may be warranted by the particular facts and circumstances in the
case of any alien to determine deportability.127 A similar provision
relating to custody after the entry of a final order of deportation
provides that judicial review may be had "upon a conclusive showing
in habeas corpus proceedings that the Attorney General is not pro-
ceeding with such reasonable dispatch as may be warranted by the
particular facts and circumstances in the case of any alien to effect
such alien's departure from the United States within such six month
period.' 28
The Sixth Circuit has held that these specific provisions for habeas
corpus relief are the sole statutory remedies for an alien who is un-
lawfully detained.2 9 Therefore, that court refused to imply a private
statutory remedy for damages under the INA for an alien who
claimed unlawful detention.
Although the foregoing statutory provisions suggest that habeas
review of a custody determination is limited to an examination of
whether the Attorney General and his delegees are proceeding with
due speed in the case, courts have looked somewhat more broadly
into the overall justification for the detention or the amount of bond
set in order to determine whether the discretion to detain has been
abused.30 The alien, however, bears the heavy burden of establishing
that the detention or bond amount is improper."' The administrative
decision will be reversed only upon a showing of a lack of "any basis
in fact" for the decision, or that the decision "was without reasona-
ble foundation. 32 The Third Circuit recently concluded that when a
district court grants a stay of deportation to a detained alien, that
court nevertheless lacks jurisdiction to release the alien on bond, and
must remand the case to the district director to determine custody.33
There is support for the view that an alien may not seek judicial
review of a detention decision unless he has exhausted available ad-
27. INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 242(a).
28. Id. § 242(c), 8 U.S.C. § 242(c).
29. Chairez v. INS, 790 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1986).
30. United States ex rel. Yaris v. Esperdy, 202 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1953).
31. United States ex rel. Barbour v. District Director, 491 F.2d 573, 577-78 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Bartholomeu v. District Director, 487 F. Supp.
315 (D. Md. 1980).
32. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 540-41 (1952); Doherty v. Meese, No. 86-
2335, slip op. at 8-9 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 1986); United States ex rel. Barbour v. District
Director, 491 F.2d 573, 577-78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Makarian
v. Turnage, 624 F. Supp. 181, 184 (S.D. Cal. 1985).
33. In re Ghalamsiah, 806 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1986).
ministrative remedies.3 4 However, the Ninth Circuit held that the
exhaustion requirement of the Act applies only to final orders of ex-
clusion and deportation, and not to conditions placed on bonds prior
to such orders.35
Excludable Aliens
Aliens are subject to exclusion if they have not "entered" the
United States as that term is used in the immigration laws.36 An
alien whose admissibility to the United States is questioned at a land
border, a seaport, or an airport has not "entered" the United States,
and may be held for exclusion proceedings.
Detention of excludable aliens differs in a number of significant
ways from the detention of deportable aliens. While the deportation
statutes mention the Attorney General's detention authority in per-
missive terms, the detention language of the exclusion statute is
mandatory:
Every alien (other than an alien crewman), and except as otherwise pro-
vided in subsection (c) of this section [relating to security risks] and in
section 273(d) [relating to stowaways], who may not appear to the examin-
ing immigration officer at the port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to land shall be detained for further inquiry to be conducted
by a special inquiry officer [immigration judge] .Y
The exception to the general statutory provision for detention of
arriving inadmissible aliens is contained in the statutory authority of
the Attorney General and his delegees to "parole" inadmissible
aliens. The Act provides:
The Attorney General may, except as provided in subparagraph (B), in his
discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions
as he may prescribe for emergency reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in
the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States,
but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the
34. Massoumi-Demaghi v. Weiss, 631 F. Supp. 1525 (D. Conn. 1986). This deci-
sion does not purport to establish an absolute requirement of exhaustion in a bond situa-
tion, but rather applies the preclusion when the issue is one which "can reasonably be
reviewed by the BIA." Id. at 1526.
35. National Center for Immigrants' Rights v. INS, 644 F. Supp. 5 (C.D. Cal.
1985), affid, 791 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded for further consider-
ation in light of IRCA, 107 S. Ct. 1881 (1987).
36. See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958). The term "entry" is
defined in INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). The BIA has interpreted "entry"
as involving physical presence in the United States, plus an inspection and admission by
an immigration officer or actual and intentional evasion of inspection coupled with free-
dom from restraint. In re Phelisna, 18 I. & N. Dec. 272 (BIA 1982); see also Pierre v.
Rivkind, 643 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Fla. 1986), appeal docketed (upholding the BIA's ap-
plication of the Phelisna criteria). At least one court has disagreed with the BIA's inter-
pretation. In re Phelisna, 551 F. Supp. 960 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
37. INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (emphasis added). Security risks, crew-
men, and stowaways are also subject to detention, but are not entitled to exclusion hear-
ings before immigration judges. INA §§ 235(c), 252(a), 273(d), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(c),
1282(a), 1323(b).
[VOL. 24: 305. 1987] Detention of Aliens
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the At-
torney General, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be re-
turned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for
admission to the United States."8
Current INS regulations make detention mandatory for aliens
who arrive at the border without any documentation or with facially
false documentation. 9 Aliens who arrive with documentation, but
nevertheless appear to be inadmissible, may be detained or paroled. 40
Detention of documented arrivals who appear to be inadmissible de-
pends upon whether the inspecting officer determines that they
would be likely to abscond or pose a security risk if paroled. 41 These
INS regulations have been upheld against a number of attacks, in-
cluding claims that they are discriminatory and that they lack a ra-
tional basis.4 2
Regulations previously provided that detained aliens who arrived
by certain international carriers could be placed in the custody of the
carrier.43 However, enactment of the Department of Justice Appro-
priations Act for fiscal year 1987 repealed the provision of the Act
relating to carrier custody.4 4 Therefore, the INS has assumed cus-
tody of excludable aliens who formerly were placed in carrier
custody.45
Unlike the situation of deportable aliens, no statutory provisions
38. INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
39. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (1986).
40. Id. § 235.3(c).
41. Id.
42. Singh v. Nelson, 623 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 627
F. Supp. 13 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Bedredin v. Sava, 627 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Application of Pierre, 605 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Pa. 1985); cf. Tobia v. Sava, 556 F.
Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). For a discussion of detention and parole criteria, including
the lack of documentation, prior to the the 1982 promulgation of regulations establishing
rules for the detention and parole of arriving potentially excludable aliens, see Bertrand
v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982).
43. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(d).
44. INA § 233, 8 U.S.C. § 1223 formerly made the carrier which brought an
alien to the United States responsible either for detaining such alien until the immigra-
tion inspection process was completed, or for paying the costs of detention if the alien
were taken into INS custody. This provision was repealed, effective October 18, 1986, by
section 206 of the Continuing Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1987, Title II, Depart-
ment of Justice, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341-56 (1986). Section 205 of that same
act created a fund, paid for by user fees charged to airline passengers, to reimburse the
INS for detention and removal expenses, as well as to defray other INS costs relating to
the immigration inspection process. The user fee provision is codified as section 286(d) of
the INA.
45. See Notice of Statutory Provision, paras. 9-10, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,547, 41,549
(1986).
provide for the setting of bond or the release on recognizance of
aliens detained for exclusion proceedings. Any release must be ob-
tained through the Attorney General's parole authority which has
been delegated to INS district directors .4  There are no regulations
giving a detained excludable alien recourse to an immigration judge
or the Board regarding custody status.
INS regulations provide seven categories of detained excludable
aliens who may be considered for parole: (1) aliens with serious med-
ical conditions; (2) pregnant women; (3) certain juveniles; (4) aliens
with close relatives in the United States who have filed a visa peti-
tion for the detainee; (5) aliens who are needed as witnesses in ad-
ministrative, judicial, or legislative proceedings; (6) aliens being
brought to the United States for prosecution; and (7) aliens whose
continued detention is not in the public interest as determined by the
district director.47 This last category is a catch-all which can encom-
pass a number of factors not specifically listed, such as the lack of
suitable detention space, health problems, prolonged detention, lack
of ability to remove the alien, and unusual humanitarian factors.
The INS parole regulations pertaining to excludable aliens also
have been upheld against attacks based upon constitutional, statu-
tory, and international law grounds.48 For example, one district court
found that even if an alien had a relative placing him within the
category eligible for release, it was not an abuse of discretion for the
INS to deny parole where the alien previously had absconded. 49
The district director may impose reasonable conditions upon an
alien paroled under the regulations." Such conditions may include a
bond or a periodic reporting of whereabouts.51 In determining the
46. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a) (1986). District directors are INS field management offi-
cials who exercise authority delegated from the Commissioner of Immigration and Natu-
ralization and perform both informal and adjudicative and law enforcement functions
under the Act. Id. § 103.1(n).
47. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a).
48. Singh v. Nelson, 623 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 627
F. Supp. 13 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Bedredin v. Sava, 627 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Application of Pierre, 605 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Pa. 1985); cf. Bertrand v. Sava,
684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982); Ledesma-Valdes v. Sava, 604 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Tobia v. Sava, 556 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Abu Laban v. Sava, 564 F.
Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y 1985). In Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992, 2996 (1985) (later pro-
ceeding, Louis v. Nelson, 624 F. Supp. 636 (S.D. Fla. 1985)), the Court accepted the
parties' contention that the parole regulation in question "requires even-handed treat-
ment and prohibits the consideration of race and national origin in the parole decision."
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit without reaching the question
of whether excludable aliens have any constitutional rights with respect to the immigra-
tion process. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (1 1th Cir.), reh'g denied, 793 F.2d 908 (11th
Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 563 (1984), affid, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985).
49. St. Fleur v. Sava, 617 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ledesma-Valdes v.
Sava, 604 F. Supp. 675, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
50. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(c).
51. Id. § 212.5(c)(1), (3).
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necessity for a bond, or the proper amount of the bond, the district
director usually considers the paroled alien's ties to family and com-
munity. 52 Unlike a deportable alien, a paroled excludable alien who
is dissatisfied with the amount of the bond or the conditions of re-
lease has no recourse to an immigration judge or the Board. Neither
the immigration judges nor the Board has been given the power to
exercise the Attorney General's authority to parole excludable
aliens.53
The situation of detained excludable aliens following a final order
of exclusion also contrasts with that of deportable aliens following a
final order of deportation. The exclusion statute speaks of "immedi-
ate deportation" unless the Attorney General "in his discretion, con-
cludes that immediate deportation is not practicable or proper.""
There is, however, no statutory six-month limitation on the detention
of excludable aliens following the entry of a final order of exclusion.
The Supreme Court and two circuit courts of appeals have supported
the government's position that such detention may be indefinite. 55
However, one appellate court has suggested that detention following
an order of exclusion should be limited to a reasonable period of
time during which the government is making bona fide efforts to re-
move the alien.5
52. Id. § 212.5(c)(2).
53. In re Alphonse, 18 I. & N. Dec. 178 (BIA 1981); In re Lepofsky, 14 I. & N.
Dec. 718 (BIA 1974).
54. INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). In a curious holding that went beyond the
position asserted by the government, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that this provision nar-
rowly limited the INS district director's authority to grant a stay of removal to an ex-
cludable alien to situations involving difficulty in making travel arrangements, or the
need of the alien to serve as a witness as provided in section 237(d). Zardui-Quintana v.
Richard, 768 F.2d 1213 (1 1th Cir. 1985). Thus, the court ruled that the district director
had no jurisdiction to consider or grant stays of exclusion for detained Mariel Cubans
who wished to move to reopen their exclusion proceedings before the immigration judge
in order to apply for asylum. Id. The court stated that such stays, however, could be
granted by the immigration judge considering the motion to reopen. Id. at 1220. The
court did not explain how the immigration judge could derive more authority from the
statute than could the district director who, under 8 C.F.R. § 237.1 (1986), appears to
have been granted all of the Attorney General's authority to stay deportation under sec-
tion 237 of the INA. Judge Vance, concurring in the result, would have found jurisdic-
tion in the district director and would have upheld his denial of stays on the merits. Id. at
1220-23 (Vance, J., concurring).
55. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Garcia-
Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v.
Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986); Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1982). See
infra text accompanying notes 115-38.
56. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). See in-fra text accompanying notes 117-18.
The government's greater latitude in the treatment of excludable
aliens is based upon the traditional view of the courts that aliens at
the border of the United States have no constitutional rights with
respect to the immigration process, and therefore are limited to
whatever rights Congress specifically confers by statute.5 7 On the
other hand, aliens who have "entered" the United States have due
process rights with respect to the procedures for deportation. 8
Consistent with the foregoing view, the scope of judicial review of
detention decisions for excludable aliens is very narrow. The govern-
ment has argued that there should be no judicial review of the merits
of the decision to detain or refuse to parole an excludable, or poten-
tially excludable, alien.59 Recently, courts have found that the deci-
sion to detain or refuse to parole such an alien may be reviewed in
habeas corpus proceedings for abuse of discretion.6" The Eleventh
Circuit has concluded that no abuse of discretion can be found as
long as the government's decision is supported by a "facially legiti-
mate and bona fide reason." 1 This standard was enunciated by the
Supreme Court in 1972 in Kleindienst v. Mandel.2
The "entry" distinction between excludable and deportable aliens
has been criticized by commentators.63 Indeed, that distinction might
suggest that an excludable alien would improve his position with re-
spect to the immigration laws by escaping from detention during the
pendency of exclusion proceedings and claiming to have "entered."
57. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982); Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651
(1892).
58. See, e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86
(1903).
59. See, e.g., Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1982). In Palma, the
court declined to reach the argument advanced by the government that review was lim-
ited to whether the applicant was a citizen or alien and whether statutory procedures
relating to exclusion had been followed. Id. at 105.
60. See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1485 (1 1th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied sub nom. Marquez-Medina v. Meese, 106 S. Ct. 1213 (1986); Jean v. Nelson,
727 F.2d 957 (1 lth Cir. 1984), affid on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985); Palma v.
Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1982); Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.
1982); cf. Moret v. Karn, 746 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1984) (district director abused discre-
tion by failing to follow proper agency guidelines for parole revocation).
61. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1485 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub
nom. Marquez-Medina v. Meese, 106 S. Ct. 1213 (1986); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957,
977 (11 th Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985); Sidney v. Hower-
ton, 777 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1985).
62. 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (reviewing the denial of a nonimmigrant waiver for an
alien inadmissible to the United States because of his advocacy of the doctrine of world
communism).
63. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties". A Re-
sponse to Martin, 44 U. Pi-r. L. REV. 237 (1983); Martin, Due Process and Member-
ship in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PiT. L. REV. 165
(1983).
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Rejecting this notion, however, the Board held that an excludable
alien who escapes from detention during the pendency of exclusion
proceedings remains subject to exclusion when apprehended."
Specific Detention Issues
Use of Non-INS Detention Facilities
The INA gives the Attorney General specific authority to "ar-
range for appropriate places of detention for those aliens whom he
shall take into custody and detain ... ."65 It further specifically
provides for the acquisition of land and the construction of buildings
for the detention of aliens.6"
In accordance with this authority, the INS has acquired, through
purchase or lease, the physical premises for a number of INS-run
detention facilities, known as Service Processing Centers. These
processing centers are currently located in Boston, Massachusetts;
New York, New York; Miami, Florida; Los Fresnos, Texas; El Paso,
Texas; Florence, Arizona; and El Centro, California. In Oakdale,
Louisiana, a Federal Detention Center is run by the Bureau of Pris-
ons for the INS. This 1000-bed capacity center is the largest in the
INS system devoted to the detention of general alien populations.
However, in October 1986 the INS announced that the Oakdale fa-
cility temporarily would be converted to an additional long-term fa-
cility for excludable Mariel Cubans who have committed serious
crimes in the United States or Cuba.67 The Atlanta Federal Peniten-
tiary is run by the Bureau of Prisons and also is devoted solely to the
detention of excludable Mariel Cuban criminals.
The needs of the INS for detention space cannot be met entirely
through the existing Service Processing Centers. Since many of the
aliens are apprehended some distance from the nearest Service
Processing Center, short-term custody is needed until transfer can be
arranged. Moreover, the limited number of beds in the INS system
often cannot accommodate the number of aliens in INS custody.
Since the INS centers are basically minimum-to-medium security
64. In re Lin, 18 I. & N. Dec. 219 (BIA 1982). But see In re Ching & Chen,
Interim Dec. No. 2984 (BIA 1984) (aliens who were denied admission by immigration
officer, accepted decision, and escaped from carrier custody while awaiting removal, "en-
tered" the United States and were entitled to a deportation hearing).
65. INA § 242(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c).
66. Id.
67. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Southern Re-
gional Office, Press Release, Oct. 16, 1986.
facilities, they are inappropriate for confining aliens who have been
involved in violent criminal activities, or aliens requiring specialized
medical care, or juveniles.68 For these and other reasons, the INS
must secure additional detention space.
Some of the additional space can be obtained from the Bureau of
Prisons. However, the INS interprets its authority as permitting con-
tracts for the detention of aliens with state and local governments
and private entities.69 A number of these "contract facilities" are
utilized by the INS around the country. The largest contract facility
is in Houston, Texas. The aliens detained at contract facilities are
considered to be the responsibility of the INS.70 As part of the con-
tracting process, the contractor must agree to comply with certain
conditions and standards set by the INS.7 1
One district court held that the detention of aliens is a federal
responsibility and that the INS may not avoid responsibility for what
happens to a detained alien when that alien is placed by a carrier
into the custody of a private guard service.7 2 However, that case in-
volved a unique situation because the alien was a stowaway. Under
specific provisions of the Act, the detention of alien stowaways is the
responsibility of the carrier which brought them to the United
States.78 In the particular case, the INS asserted that it was the re-
sponsibility of the carrier, not the INS, to arrange for an adequate
guard service. Accordingly, the INS had not entered into a contrac-
tual relationship with the guard service. Normally, however, when an
alien is taken into custody by the INS, the INS ultimately is respon-
sible for the well-being of that alien, regardless of whether the alien
is detained in an INS or non-INS facility.
Location of Detention and Access to Counsel
Somewhat related to the issue of the use of non-INS detention
facilities are the issues of the location of detention facilities and ac-
cess to counsel. Allegations have been made in various lawsuits that
68. The normal assumption that INS detention centers, other than the Atlanta
Penitentiary, need not have high security levels because of the noncriminal nature of the
detainees has been questioned in connection with the INS Varick Street facility in New
York City. The New York Times reported that 116 of the 173 detainees in Varick Street
in April 1986 had criminal records, including 77 who had been convicted of violent
crimes. Alien Detention Center Held Inadequate, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1986, at B4, col.
1. 25 escapes from Varick Street were reported between June 1985 and June 1986. Id.
69. Memorandum from Maurice C. Inman, Jr., General Counsel, INS, to Hugh
G. Brien, Assistant Commissioner, Detention and Deportation, INS, Concerning Con-
tracting Out for Detention Facilities (March 23, 1984) (General Counsel Opinion No.
84-8) (on file with author).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984), appeal docketed.
73. INA § 273(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1323(d).
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the INS purposely transfers detained aliens to remote locations
where they will be unable to obtain counsel. 4 Claims also have been
made that apprehended aliens have a right to remain in a particular
location so that they may avail themselves of free legal representa-
tives who have a particular area of expertise, for example in present-
ing Central American asylum claims.7 5 In response, the INS has as-
serted that there are compelling governmental reasons for
transferring aliens, such as overcrowding, institutional security,
availability of immigration judges, cost savings, and ease of making
travel arrangements for the removal of aliens found excludable or
deportable.
No court ruling on the merits has sustained a claim of bad motive
on the part of the government in arranging transfers of detained
aliens.76 The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the government gen-
erally has wide latitude in deciding the place of detention.7 7 How-
ever, in a case in which an alien had been transferred nearly 3000
74. See, e.g., Roshan v. Smith, 615 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1985) (action to pre-
vent completion and operation of Oakdale alien detention center dismissed for lack of
ripeness, lack of standing, and failure to state a claim under first amendment). Since the
opening of the Oakdale facility in March 1986, several suits have been filed challenging
the transfer policy. Bonilla v. Nelson, No. CV-86-2353 (E.D.N.Y. filed July 21, 1986);
Velasquez v. Nelson, No. 86-1262-CIV-RYSKAMP (S.D. Fla. filed June 12, 1986). In
Velasquez, the district judge declined to prohibit the holding of hearings at Oakdale.
However, the judge did enter an order for a limited preliminary injunction requiring the
government to file change of venue motions in deportation cases of detained aliens who
were transferred from the Krome facility in the Miami district to Oakdale following a
disturbance on May 28, 1986 which partially destroyed the men's dormitories at Krome.
A claim of denial of first amendment rights in connection with access to detained Hai-
tians was raised by the plaintiffs, but was not finally adjudicated by the courts, in Jean v.
Nelson, 727 F.2d at 983. As mentioned earlier, see supra text accompanying note 67, the
INS now is using the Oakdale facility for Mariel Cuban detention, rather than general
detention.
75. Such a claim was rejected by the district court in Committee of Cent. Am.
Refugees v. INS, No. C-85-2167-JPV (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1985), afid, 795 F.2d 1434
(9th Cir. 1986) (order denying preliminary injunction).
76. Following the Mariel boatlift in 1980, exclusion hearings were held for de-
tained Cubans at various federal detention facilities. One of these facilities was the Mc-
Neil Island Federal Penitentiary, operated by the Bureau of Prisons. Many of the
Cubans detained at McNeil Island were represented by pro bono counsel provided by the
local bar association. For various budgetary and management reasons, it became neces-
sary for the Bureau of Prisons to close the McNeil Island facility. The government pro-
posed to transfer the Cubans to other federal facilities. In an unpublished decision, a
federal district judge entered an order granting a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
government from moving certain plaintiffs who were represented by pro bono counsel in
the exclusion proceedings, finding that the hardship to the plaintiffs if deprived of counsel
outweighed the inconvenience to the government. Chavez-Galen v. Turnage, No. C80-
485T (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 1981) (order granting preliminary injunction).
77. Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1985).
miles removing him from his only friend in the United States, had a
limited education, spoke only Spanish, and was generally unfamiliar
with the legal system, the same court held that a grant by an immi-
gration judge of two continuances for a total of two working days in
order to obtain counsel was insufficient and constituted a denial of
due process.78
The remoteness, or perceived remoteness, of an INS facility ap-
parently can be an influential factor with courts in determining the
reasonableness of INS actions with respect to counsel. In a case in-
volving the INS Los Fresnos facility, located approximately twenty
miles from Brownsville, Texas, and thirty miles from Harlingen,
Texas, the district court considered the remote location of the facil-
ity in preliminarily enjoining the INS from prohibiting visits by at-
torneys after 3:30 p.m.79 The court also found that the remote loca-
tion of the facility made it necessary that attorneys be allowed to
utilize paralegals and legal assistants to interview detainees, and re-
quired the INS to permit such individuals access to the detainees.8 0
However, the court found that the INS could permissibly bar parale-
gals and legal assistants who were neither United States citizens nor
lawful permanent resident aliens.8'
In 1981, in the context of an application for a preliminary injunc-
tion, a federal district judge criticized the government for moving a
number of detained Haitian aliens out of the Krome North facility
in Miami, Florida, to various federal detention facilities throughout
the country.8 2 That judge, however, did not order the INS to return
the aliens to Miami. Following an extensive trial in that case, an-
other federal district judge, although critical of the manner in which
the transfer was carried out, found that the transfer was necessary in
light of the government's representations to the court in another suit
brought by the State of Florida about overpopulation in the Krome
facility. 3
Perhaps the most difficult situations involve the transfer of aliens
78. Id.
79. Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex.) (preliminary injunction), ap-
peal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982).
80. Nunez, 537 F. Supp. at 582.
81. Id.
82. Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924, 926-27 (S.D. Fla. 1981). In Louis, the
district judge enjoined the INS from holding exclusion hearings for a class consisting of
unrepresented Haitians in detention. The case later was transferred to another districtjudge who modified the injunction to permit the holding of exclusion hearings if the
aliens were individually represented by pro bono counsel. Louis v. Meissner, 532 F. Supp.
881, 884-85 n.6, 892-93 (S.D. Fla. 1982). For the subsequent history of this procedurally
complex case which later reached the Supreme Court on another issue, see infra note 83.
83. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 983-84 n.27 (S.D. Fla. 1982), appeal
dismissed in part, rev'd in part, and remanded with instructions on other grounds sub
nom. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct.
2992 (1985).
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who already are represented by counsel in a particular locality.84 In
a 1985 case involving the transfer of detained excludable aliens who
were represented by counsel, a district court found that no denial of
rights occurred in the absence of a showing that the transfer was
intended to deprive the aliens of representation.8 5 That case involved
a group of Cubans who arrived in New York with counterfeit travel
documents and consequently were detained for exclusion proceed-
ings. They were placed in the custody of airline carriers. Most of the
aliens retained New York counsel. Before the exclusion proceedings
actually commenced, thirteen of the fifty-two detained aliens es-
caped. Another four escaped during the pendency of proceedings.
Thereupon, the INS transferred most of the remaining aliens to an
INS facility in El Paso. Legal services, both retained and free, were
available to the aliens.
The aliens claimed that the transfer deprived them of their statu-
tory right to counsel and their fifth amendment right to due process.
The court rejected both of these claims, finding that the INS was
justified in seeking to transfer the aliens in light of the escapes and
the lack of suitable facilities available in New York. The court also
found that the aliens could obtain counsel in El Paso, or in the alter-
native, their New York counsel could travel to El Paso. The court
characterized the aliens as seeking "an unqualified right to represen-
tation by particular counsel" which would exceed the sixth amend-
ment right of an individual charged with a crime.86
It is unclear what the scope of this ruling might be as applied to
other detention situations. It could be viewed as generally allowing
the government to transfer detained represented aliens so long as an
administrative justification exists for the transfer. On the other hand,
the ruling could be viewed as limited by the facts: the plaintiffs were
excludable aliens, there was a demonstrable escape problem, and re-
tained or free legal counsel was available in the El Paso location.
A federal district court in California has rejected an attempt to
preliminarily enjoin the INS from transferring detained Central
American asylum applicants out of the INS San Francisco Dis-
trict.8 7 The plaintiffs claimed that such transfers deprived those
84. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
85. Ledesma-Valdes v. Sava, 604 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
86. Id. at 682.
87. Committee of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, No. C-85-2167-JPV (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 20, 1986) (order denying preliminary injunction), affid, 795 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir.
1986). In an earlier order in the same case, upon which the court based its September
20, 1986 order denying the preliminary injunction, the court stated:
aliens of expertise in the presentation of asylum claims which was
available from free legal services groups operating in the San Fran-
cisco area. In affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit noted
that no on-going attorney-client relationship had been established.88
Thus, it is difficult to discern what importance, if any, the appellate
court would attach to the fact that the aliens to be transferred are
represented.
A suit was filed prior to the opening of the Oakdale facility to
enjoin the transfer of aliens to Oakdale on the ground of lack of
availability of legal representation; it was dismissed because no
plaintiff actually had been transferred."" Prior to the conversion of
the Oakdale Facility for use by Mariel Cuban criminals, the INS
had developed a transfer policy with respect to the Oakdale facility,
which stated in pertinent part:
Aliens who establish a bonafide local attorney-client relationship . . . may
be retained at their present location. If, notwithstanding such attorney-cli-
ent relationship, it is determined that the best interests of the government
would be served by his/her transfer, application should be made to EOIR;
for change of venue in cases where the proceedings document has already
been submitted to EOIR; or the prompt transfer of the alien and the relat-
ing documents to EOIR in Oakdale in cases where the proceedings docu-
ment has not yet been submitted to EOIR (sic).9'
A detained alien who is dissatisfied with his place of hearing is not
without administrative remedy. Under the current law, a detained
deportable alien may apply to an immigration judge for a change of
venue which may be granted or denied in the exercise of the judge's
discretion.9 1 Paroled excludable aliens also may seek a change of
venue.9 2 The Board had held that an immigration judge lacked juris-
diction to consider a motion for change of venue for an alien who has
The right to assistance of counsel as provided in the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act does not support the conclusion that detention outside of the San
Francisco area amounts to a denial of due process. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b),
1362. The government simply is not obligated to detain aliens where their abil-
ity to obtain representation is at its greatest.
Committee of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, No. C-85-2167-JPV, slip op. at I (N.D. Cal.
May 2, 1985) (order denying preliminary injunction), affd, 795 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir.
1986).
88. Committee of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1986).
89. Roshan v. Smith, 615 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1985). The court characterized
the first amendment claim that the government was required to "provide them with cli-
ents in their locality, or otherwise make access to such clients as geographically conven-
ient as possible," as having "absurd" implications. Id. at 907.
90. Memorandum concerning Oakdale Federal Alien Detention Center, U.S. Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, Policy and Procedures, reprinted in 63 INTER-
PRETER RELEAsES 333-34 (1986). As noted earlier, see supra text accompanying note 67,
the INS temporarily has converted the entire Oakdale facility for the use of detaining
excludable Mariel Cubans.
91. In re Seren, 15 I. & N. Dec. 590 (BIA 1976).
92. In re Wadas, 17 I. & N. Dec. 346 (BIA 1980).
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been detained pending exclusion proceedings.93 The rationale for this
rule was that such change of venue would interfere with the exclu-
sive jurisdiction conferred by the regulations on INS district direc-
tors to detain or parole aliens subject to exclusion proceedings. How-
ever, final rules of procedure recently adopted by the EOIR changed
this rule, and detained aliens in exclusion proceedings are now al-
lowed to seek changes of venue.9'
Whatever the outcome of pending litigation, it seems likely that
the scope of the government's authority to transfer aliens, especially
those represented by counsel, will remain an issue of contention.
Conditions of Detention
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the conditions applicable to
detained aliens. Since aliens being detained for civil immigration
purposes are not being incarcerated for crimes, the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is inapplicable. 5
Thus it is not clear what conditions, if any, may be constitutionally
required, and whether the conditions which must be provided to de-
tained excludable aliens can differ from those which must be pro-
vided to detained deportable aliens. As a practical matter, in all fa-
cilities except the Atlanta Penitentiary, which is limited to
excludable Mariel Cubans, the INS intermingles deportable and ex-
cludable aliens without any distinction as to the conditions of
confinement.
In the absence of definitive Supreme Court guidance, lower courts
have assumed that the conditions of confinement for detained aliens
are governed by the criteria established by the Supreme Court in
Bell v. Wolfish.98 That case, which involved pretrial detainees in the
Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City, held that the
judiciary should give broad deference to prison administrators, so
long as such officials were acting in a manner reasonably related to
the orderly operation of the facility, and were not seeking to impose
"punishment" upon the pretrial detainees.
93. In re Alphonse, 18 I. & N. Dec. 178 (BIA 1981).
94. 8 C.F.R. § 3.19 (1987) (as adopted in 52 Fed. Reg. 2931, 2937 (Jan. 29,
1987)).
95. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979).
96. 441 U.S. 520 (1979); see also Application of Pierre, 605 F. Supp. 266, 268
n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Ortega v. Rowe, No. CA-5-81-198, slip op. at 20 (N.D. Tex. July
23, 1985), affd on other grounds, 796 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1986); Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F.
Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982); Orantes-
Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 384 (S.D. Cal. 1982).
In 1981 the INS entered into a stipulated settlement of a major
suit concerning conditions at the former INS Service Processing
Center in Brooklyn. 97 Without any admission of wrongdoing, the
INS agreed to make a number of changes in the physical plant,
medical procedures, recreation, visitation, intake orientation, search
procedures and disciplinary procedures. A court-appointed monitor
reviewed compliance with the agreement until the spring of 1984,
when the Brooklyn facility officially was closed and the INS facility
was relocated.98
Since 1981, the INS has developed extensive guidelines for the
operation of detention centers.99 The Operational Manual For Ser-
vice Processing Centers, originally issued in 1983, deals with a wide
range of subjects, such as intake, grievances, mail, attorney and me-
dia access, religious and medical services, library facilities, recrea-
tional and other programs, visitation, and other procedures. These
guidelines were developed, to a large extent, from model standards
of the American Correctional Association.'"0
In 1982, in connection with proceedings for preliminary injunc-
tions concerning the INS facilities in Los Fresnos, Texas, and in El
Centro, California, two federal district courts found shortcomings in
the procedures relating to attorney and paralegal access, access to
legal materials, access to telephones, access to writing materials, and
disciplinary procedures. 01 No final decision on the merits has been
97. Man Chung Lam v. Smith, No. CV-79-795 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1981)
(stipulation).
98. Man Chung Lam v. Smith, No. CV-79-795 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 1984) (stipu-
lation of dismissal). The service processing center in Manhattan is in a different judicial
district.
99. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Central Office, Operational
Manual for Service Processing Centers (1983).
100. See AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR ADULT LOCAL DE-
TENTION FACILITIES (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1986). The American Correctional Associa-
tion is a professional association of administrators, managers, and practitioners working
in concert to improve overall conditions for staff and inmates of correctional facilities in
the United States. The INS currently intends to seek accreditation from the American
Correctional Association for the El Centro facility.
101. Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d
755 (5th Cir. 1982); Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
The INS policy on attorney access is as follows:
Each SPC [Service Processing Center] shall establish visiting hours to allow
attorneys to meet with detainees who are their clients, to the maximum extent
possible. But, these hours shall not unreasonably interfere with the normal and
necessary routines of the facility or compromise security.
Operational Manual for Service Processing Centers, supra note 99, at 45.
The INS policy on paralegals is as follows:
Paralegals may interview detainees, complete forms and deliver papers without
the attorney being present .... Each paralegal must have a letter from the
employer-attorney identifying him or her and stating that he or she is em-
ployed and supervised by the attorney. Paralegals must be a [sic] citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the
United States.
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rendered in either of these cases.
In another 1982 case, a district court in Colorado found that
aliens arrested during "Project Jobs" were taken to an INS deten-
tion facility where they were held for several days without adequate
food, water, bathing, or sleeping facilities.10 2 The court held that
while the eighth amendment did not apply to the civil deportation
process, fifth amendment due process did apply and had been vio-
lated in the case. The court noted that although the facility would be
adequate for the ordinary brief INS detention, it was inappropriate
for the lengthier type of detention which had taken place.
In a 1984 case in the Southern District of Texas concerning the
detention of aliens in a carrier custody, the district court concluded
that immigration detention must provide adequate space, one bed
per person, recreation facilities, and proper meals. 103 The court
found that the detention of the aliens in that case violated those min-
imum standards.
On the other hand, in a 1985 suit involving conditions in local jails
utilized by the INS Border Patrol in a twenty-eight county area of
Texas, another district court concluded after lengthy hearings that
no violations of statutory or constitutional rights had occurred.
1°4
The court noted that the INS had initiated a process of developing
uniform standards for non-INS detention facilities as early as 1979.
The court found that guidelines, modeled on those of the United
States Marshals Service, and setting forth minimum requirements in
the areas of supervision, safety, food service, and medical care, had
been issued in 1982, and that such issuance was not in response to
the lawsuit. Applying the Wolfish test, the court stated:
The conditions of detention were mildly uncomfortable, and Border Patrol
procedures were slightly inconvenient. They certainly were not violative of
any constitutional rights since they were closely related to legitimate gov-
ernmental interests and were not imposed in an attempt to punish.105
On appeal the Fifth Circuit adopted a different approach.108 The
court found that under the Supreme Court's recent rulings in Dan-
iels v. Williams "07 and Davidson v. Cannon,10 8 mere allegations of
Id. at 45.1.
102. Garcia v. INS, No. 82-680 (D. Colo. Nov. 4, 1982).
103. Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984), appeal docketed.
104. Ortega v. Rowe, No. CA-5-81-198 (N.D. Tex. July 23, 1985), affd on other
grounds, 796 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1986).
105. Id. slip op. at 23.
106. Ortega v. Rowe, 796 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1986).
107. 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
108. 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
negligence are not cognizable under the due process clause.10 9 The
court noted that a claim under the Wolfish analysis could be made
"[o]nly if the evidence suggests that the appellees knew of the jails'
conditions or intended to force the detainees to endure such condi-
tions."110 Since the court concluded that the appellant was alleging
"nothing more than negligent supervision," the appeal was dismissed
for failure to state a constitutional claim. 1'
Another issue related to conditions of detention is the payment of
detainees for voluntary labor performed in the detention facility.
Statutory provisions limit INS payments to alien detainees to one
dollar per day.112 Attempts to raise this limit have failed. In 1986 a
class of present and former detainees filed a suit claiming that the
one dollar per day limitation violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act.113
Finally, third parties have unsuccessfully attempted to challenge
the "unsafe" operation of INS detention facilities. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida recently dismissed
on standing grounds a suit brought by a United States Senator, the
Governor of Florida, Dade County, and local homeowners claiming
that the INS operated the Krome detention facility in a "manifestely
unsafe manner. 1124
In the absence of a Supreme Court definition of which standards
are applicable to civil immigration detainees, it appears that the
lower courts will apply the Wolfish criteria to require the Service to
meet certain minimum standards, especially in the areas of attorney
access and access to legal materials. However, the Fifth Circuit has
now suggested that Wolfish may not even be applicable unless the
claims against the INS are based upon intentional, rather than
merely negligent, conduct on the part of INS officials. The Service
has been working toward developing uniform standards for both INS
and non-INS detention facilities. At the same time, the private bar
will continue to litigate in order to establish more.definite statements
from the courts as to the standards the INS is legally required to
meet.
Length of Detention
At one time it might have been assumed that most immigration
detention would be strictly short-term. Aliens would be detained for
109. Ortega, 796 F.2d at 767-68.
110. Id. at 768.
111. Id. at 768-69.
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1555; Department of Justice Appropriation Act, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-86, 91 Stat. 426 (1977).
113. Alvarado v. INS, No. B-86-106 (S.D. Tex. filed May 16, 1986).
114. Chiles v. Meese, No. 85-3654-CIV-RYSKAMP (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 1986).
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brief periods while arranging for bond, or being processed for volun-
tary departure or deportation. Indeed, the bulk of INS detention is
still short in nature. However, a number of factors in recent years
have led to an increase in the number of aliens being held by the
INS for longer periods of time.
First, the Cuban boatlift of 1980 brought to the United States
several thousand dangerous criminals who, even though found ex-
cludable, could not be returned to Cuba because the Cuban govern-
ment refused to accept them. Second, the establishment of a deten-
tion policy for aliens arriving in the United States without
documentation increased the number of such aliens in detention.
Many such arrivals were applicants for asylum, thereby increasing
the amount of time required for hearings on excludability.
Third, there has been an increase in the number of excludable
aliens arriving through third countries. Some of these aliens, princi-
pally Afghans, cannot be returned to their home countries because of
the provisions of section 243(h) of the Act, relating to withholding of
deportation because of persecution. Arrangement of the return of
such aliens to third countries sometimes has been difficult. Finally,
the heavy workload of the immigration court system, and the
backlogs in some areas, have had an impact upon the length of
detention.
As mentioned earlier in this Article, the detention of deportable
aliens following a final order of deportation is limited by statute to
six months. 115 No such statutory limit has been placed upon the de-
tention of excludable aliens.116 Therefore, much of the litigation re-
garding the length of detention has focused upon excludable aliens.
In the 1953 case of Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL Mezei,11 7
the Supreme Court considered the situation of a former lawful per-
manent resident of the United States who had been excluded on se-
curity grounds without hearing. No country would accept him, and
he was detained on Ellis Island for a period of twenty-one months.
Mezei petitioned for habeas corpus, and the lower courts granted
that application, finding that continued detention without any realis-
tic possibility of removal constituted a denial of due process. The
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that because of Mezei's position
as an excludable alien, no statutory or constitutional basis for his
release existed.
115. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
117. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
Jean v. Nelson,11 8 a 1984 case, involved claims of discriminatory
detention of arriving Haitian aliens. The Eleventh Circuit followed
Mezei, and held that such aliens had no statutory or constitutional
rights with respect to the exclusion or parole process. However, the
court of appeals remanded the case for a determination of whether
lower level INS officials had abused their discretion by violating
facially neutral regulations and policies established by their superi-
ors. The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed Jean on narrow grounds
without addressing the constitutional issues." 9
Much of the litigation on the length of detention of excludable
aliens has focused upon the situation of excludable Mariel Cuban
criminals who have remained in long term detention because of the
refusal of the Cuban government, except for a five-month period in
1985, to accept them for return to Cuba. In 1981, in Rodriguez-
Fernandez v. Wilkinson,'20 the Tenth Circuit concluded that deten-
tion of excludable aliens
is permissible during proceedings to determine eligibility to enter and,
thereafter, during a reasonable period of negotiations for their return to the
country of origin or the transporter who brought them here. After such a
time, upon application of the incarcerated alien willing to risk the possible
alternatives to continued detention, the alien would be entitled to release.1 21
The Tenth Circuit found that there were no negotiations with
Cuba or any other country to take the petitioner, and that the gov-
ernment had shown no reason for continued detention, and therefore
ordered release. Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit distinguished Rod-
riguez-Fernandez and sustained continued detention in a case in
which the government had made a particularized determination of
the need for continued detention which had been lacking in Rodri-
guez-Fernandez.22
The vast majority of the approximately 125,000 Cubans who ar-
rived during the boatlift were paroled into the United States after a
short period of detention for initial screening. Many have had their
status regularized under the Cuban Adjustment Act.1 3 However,
118. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11 th Cir. 1984), afl'd on other grounds, 105 S.
Ct. 2992 (1985).
119. Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985).
120. 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1982).
121. Id. at 1389-90. The court believed that the "alternatives" to release either
would be return to the vessel which brought the alien to the United States, or removal to
a third country. Id. at 1390. Neither of these options were available in the cases of
Mariel Cuban criminals.
122. Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 102 (4th Cir. 1982). The court noted that
in July 1981 the Attorney General had promulgated a status review plan calling for
systematic individualized determinations by panels of Department of Justice employees
with review by a representative of the Commissioner of the INS. Id. For a discussion of
this plan, see infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
123. Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966)(amended by Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(i), 94 Stat. 108 (1980)).
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those who committed serious crimes in Cuba or in the United States
have been subject to continuing detention and exclusion proceedings,
although it generally has not been possible to execute orders of ex-
clusion to Cuba. Because of the location of the Atlanta Penitentiary,
the principal place of immigration detention for dangerous Mariel
Cubans, most cases of Cuban detainees have ended up before the
Eleventh Circuit.
In a 1984 case, Fernandez-Roque v. Smith,24 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit found the Supreme Court's decision in Mezei, and its own deci-
sion in Jean, to be controlling, and concluded that the Cuban detain-
ees had no constitutional rights with respect to the admission or
parole process. The court therefore rejected a district court ruling
which had required the Attorney General to meet certain due pro-
cess considerations in making parole decisions. 25 The court noted
that unless the government had an absolute right under the Consti-
tution to detain excludable aliens, "'[a] foreign leader could eventu-
ally compel us to grant physical admission to any aliens he wished
by the simple expedient of sending them here and then refusing to
take them back.' "126
In a 1986 case, Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 2 ' the Eleventh Circuit con-
sidered two questions not decided in Fernandez-Roque. The court
determined that detained Mariel Cubans had neither nonconstitu-
tionally-based liberty interests, nor rights under public international
law with respect to the parole process.
The court found that the public statement of former President
Carter that he welcomed the Cubans with "open arms" did not place
any substantive limits on the Attorney General's broad discretion to
detain or parole.1 28 The court held that any possible international
law claim by the detainees was extinguished both by the controlling
executive act of the Attorney General in deciding to detain the
Cubans, and by the existence of controlling judicial precedents such
as Mezei.129 In an unusually pointed statement, the court concluded:
As both the government and the appellees concede, with today's decision we
have reached the point in this longstanding controversy where we have re-
jected all legal theories, constitutional and otherwise, advanced by the ap-
124. 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984).
125. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd, 734
F.2d 576 (11 th Cir. 1984).
126. 734 F.2d at 582 (quoting Jean, 727 F.2d at 975).
127. 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese,
107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
128. Id. at 1451-52.
129. Id. at 1453-55.
pellees. They have exhausted all claims for relief available in the federal
court system at all levels save that of the Supreme Court. Accordingly it is
our judgment that, unless the appellees elect to seek, and the United States
Supreme Court elects to grant, a petition for a writ of certiorari, these
cases have reached the terminal point and shall be dismissed. 130
The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in this case.131
Thus, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, the way appears to be
cleared for indefinite detention of excludable Mariel Cuban
criminals. The American Civil Liberties Union and other groups
have written to the Secretary General of the United Nations claim-
ing human rights violations in the continued detention of Cuban
criminals. 13 2
The Attorney General adopted a status review plan in 1981 to
provide a systematic review of the cases of Mariel Cuban detainees,
with parole to suitable placements for those deemed not to be dan-
gerous to the public.133 This plan was terminated in 1985 when the
return of some of the Cuban detainees was possible during a five-
month period.134 'The plan has not been reinstituted since the break-
down of the immigration agreement with Cuba. Parole of Mariel
Cubans currently is within the discretion of the INS district director,
as in other exclusion situations.
It has been suggested that the status review plan should be
adopted as a model for all INS long-term detention.235 However, this
has not been done by the INS, since the plan was geared primarily
to the unique situation of a relatively large number of potentially
dangerous criminals who could not be removed from the United
States.
No other jurisdiction expressly has adopted the Rodriguez-Fer-
nandez test for continued detention of excludable aliens. In 1983 the
INS issued internal guidelines permitting district directors to con-
sider the release on parole of detained, noncriminal, excludable
130. Id. at 1455.
131. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
132. Letter from Ira Glasser, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union,
and Rev. William L. Wipfler, Director, Human Rights Office, National Council ofChurches of Christ in the USA, to His Excellency Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-
General, United Nations (May 29, 1986) (copy on file with author).
133. This plan is discussed in Fernandez-Roque, 734 F.2d at 579, and analyzed in
some detail in Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1141,
1161-63, 1175-78, 1203-04 (1984).
134. The plan was "temporarily suspended" in December 1984 following an agree-
ment with Cuba to accept the return of 2746 Mariel Cubans. See Garcia-Mir v. Smith,
766 F.2d at 1481. This suspension was later made permanent. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese,
788 F.2d at 1454.
135. In 1984 the Administrative Conference of the United States considered a pro-posed recommendation that the status review plan procedures be modified somewhat and
applied to all INS detainees. Immigration Procedures Request for Comments, 49 Fed.Reg. 9738, 9739 (March 15, 1984). No final recommendations on this subject were ever
adopted by the Administrative Conference. See Verkuil, supra note 133.
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aliens who have final orders of exclusion, but whose departure cannot
be enforced.136 Application of these guidelines has been noted with
apparent approval by lower courts.131 As previously noted, parole of
the detained Cuban criminals also can take place, on a case-by-case
basis, in cases in which the district director is satisfied that the dan-
ger to the community will be minimal. At least one district court,
while sustaining the detention at issue, suggested that, at some point,
continued detention of a potentially excludable asylum applicant
without a reasonably expeditious determination of the claim may be
an abuse of discretion. 3 8
Detention of Asylum Applicants
Another controversial area is the detention of aliens who have ap-
plied for asylum. 39 It is widely misperceived that the concept of de-
taining asylum applicants originated with the Reagan Administra-
tion. However, the detention of asylum applicants was one of the
recommendations contained in the March 1, 1981 final report of the
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 40 a com-
mission which was composed of executive, congressional, and public
members appointed during the Carter Administration. 1
The recommendation of the Select Commission, adopted by a vote
of 12-3, was "that an interagency body be established to develop
procedures, including plans for opening and managing federal
processing centers, for handling possible asylum emergencies."1 42
In support of this recommendation, the Select Commission noted
that by opening processing centers
- Ineligible asylum applicants would not be released into communities
136. These guidelines, issued on June 27, 1983, are described in Singh v. Sava, 623
F. Supp. 545, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
137. Id. at 562; Ishtyaq v. Sava, 627 F. Supp. 13, 14 n.1, 26.
138. Application of Pierre, 605 F. Supp. 265, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
139. For a critical view of the government's policies in this area, see LAWYERS
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS/HELSINKI WATCH, MOTHER OF EXILES (1986).
140. SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST (1981).
141. The Select Commission consisted of four cabinet members (Attorney General,
Secretary of State, Secretary of Labor, and Secretary of Health and Human Services),
four public members appointed by the President, four Senators appointed by the Presi-
dent of the Senate, and four Representatives, appointed by the Speaker of the House.
Although new cabinet officers had taken office prior to the submission of the report on
March 1, 1981, they did not participate in the deliberations or recommendations. Id. at
Vii.
142. SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, supra note 140, at
167.
where they might later evade U.S. efforts to deport them or create costs for
local governments;
- A deterrent would be provided for those who might see an asylum claim
as a means of circumventing U.S. immigration law. Applicants would notbe able to join their families or obtain work while at the processing
center.
143
On the other hand, the asylum processing centers envisioned by
the Select Commission were substantially different from the existing
INS detention centers. The asylum processing centers would have
been limited to asylum applicants from "mass asylum" situations,
and evidently would not have included other categories of detain-
ees. 14 More significantly, it was contemplated that the centers would
be staffed with expert asylum adjudicators who expeditiously and
uniformly could process the asylum applicants, with involvement of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the resettle-
ment of those applicants not accepted by the United States. 145
The law enforcement considerations supporting detention of asy-
lum applicants under certain circumstances remain valid. It should
be emphasized that INS detention policies are not in any way di-
rected against asylum applicants as a group. 1 4 A deportable alien
who wishes to apply for asylum would be detained or released in
accordance with normal bond setting and release criteria applied to
deportable aliens. An arriving alien who wishes to apply for asylum
is subject to the detention criteria for potentially excludable aliens
discussed earlier in this Article.
Because asylum applicants often may arrive without documents,
or may be recent illegal entrants into the United States, it may be
less likely that they will be able to meet the criteria for release or
raise the money to post bond. 47 Asylum hearings tend to be more
complicated than other types of hearings. Often, all appellate reme-
dies are pursued in asylum cases; therefore, the total time in deten-
tion for an asylum applicant may turn out to be substantial.
Critics of INS detention policies have claimed they operate to dis-
courage aliens from asserting asylum claims as well as administra-
tive and judicial appeals. 148 A number of unsuccessful claims have
been made that detention of asylum applicants violates the Constitu-
143. Id. at 168.
144. Id. at 166.
145. Id. at 168.
146. Compare LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS/HELSINKI WATCH,
MOTHER OF EXILES (1986).
147. See, e.g., Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 1001-02 (S.D. Fla. 1982), ap-
peal dismissed in part, rev'd in part, and remanded with instructions on other grounds
sub nom. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11 th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 105 S.
Ct. 2992 (1985) (disproportionate impact does not equate with discrimination).
148. See, e.g., A. Helton, Imprisonment of Refugees in the United States, in LAW-
YERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS/HELSINKI WATCH, MOTHER OF EXILES 62
(1986).
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tion, the Refugee Act of 1980, the Administrative Procedure Act,
various international instruments including the United Nations Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention), the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol), and
customary international law.149
Claims of violation of the Convention and Protocol have centered
on article 31 of the Convention, which states that contracting states
shall not impose "penalties" for illegal entry or presence on "refu-
gees," and that the contracting states "shall not apply to the move-
ments of such refugees restrictions other than those which are neces-
sary ... ."50 From the government standpoint, aliens are not
considered to be "refugees" until they are determined to be such by
the Attorney General through the proper legal process. 151 In addi-
tion, civil immigration detention is not considered a "penalty," but
may be considered a "necessary restriction."
A proviso to article 31 of the Convention also requires that refu-
gees who have entered a signatory country illegally "present them-
selves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their
illegal entry or presence.1 152 Few aliens who enter the country ille-
gally and who later claim asylum, meet these criteria. The govern-
ment has taken the position that use of fraudulent documents and
other misrepresentations by aliens at the time of inspection at the
border violate the proviso to article 31.153
Moreover, courts have found the Protocol to be nonself-execut-
ing. " ' That is, courts have concluded that the Protocol is not an
149. See, e.g., Amanullah v. Nelson, No. 86-1625 (1st Cir. Feb. 4, 1987); Garcia-
Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11 th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed sub noma. Ferrer-
Mazzorra v. Meese, No. 85-7230 (U.S. July 1, 1986); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957
(1 th Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985); Bertrand v. Sava, 684
F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982); Singh v. Nelson, 623 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ishtyaq v.
Nelson, 627 F. Supp. 13 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
150. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 31,
opened for signature, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Convention], incor-
porated in United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268. The Protocol incorporates
articles 2 through 34 of the Convention. The United States is not a signatory to the
Convention.
151. INA §§ 207(c)(1), 208(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c)(1), 1158(a); see also United
States v. Pereira-Pineda, 721 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Elder, 601 F.
Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
152. Convention, supra note 150, art. 31, para. 1.
153. See Singh v. Nelson, 623 F. Supp. 545, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
154. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 215-19 (2d Cir. 1982); Pierre v.
United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 434 U.S. 962 (1977);
United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985); Haitian Refugee Center v.
independent source of individual rights under the law of the United
States and that it provides no rights beyond those which Congresshas implemented through domestic law, in this case the INA, as
amended by the Refugee Act of 1980.
A district court has agreed with the government's argument that
article 31 must be read literally, and that by its own terms it can
apply only to refugees who come "directly from a territory where
their life or freedom was threatened;" the court therefore found arti-
cle 31 to be inapplicable to Afghanis who had come to the United
States through Pakistan and India. 155
The cases of such Afghanis present some of the most interesting
and highly litigated situations. Many have fled Afghanistan to refu-
gee camps in India or Pakistan. From there, they have obtained pas-
sage to the United States through fraudulent documentation or other
misrepresentations, and they apply for asylum upon arrival. This al-
lows them to avoid the lengthy waits and limited admissions availa-
ble under the United States overseas refugee program.
As arrivals with false or no documentation, the Afghanis are con-
sidered to be undocumented and therefore subject to detention pend-
ing exclusion proceedings and asylum applications. As a result of
such evasive activity, many are denied asylum in the exercise of dis-
cretion.158 However, they usually are able to establish a likelihood of
persecution in Afghanistan, and therefore are granted withholding ofdeportation to Afghanistan under § 243(h) of the INA.15 7 The
United States then commences efforts to return them to a third
country through which they came. 58 The Afghanis claim that they
are entitled to be released on parole pending such efforts to arrange
removal. While the courts have rejected such claims of entitlement,
since June 27, 1983 the INS has had a policy of pei'mitting parolefor detained excludable aliens if more than thirty days has elapsed
"after a request for travel facilities to the Department of
Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985), a ffd on other grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 627 F. Supp. 13 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).155. Singh, 623 F. Supp. at 560. This view also has been endorsed by the FirstCircuit. Amanullah v. Nelson, No. 86-1604, slip op. at 40-41 n.10 (1st Cir. Feb. 4,
1987).
156. The BIA has held that an alien who has evaded the overseas refugee process
or otherwise has engaged in subterfuge in order to get to the United States will be denied
asylum, in the exercise of discretion, in the absence of countervailing equities. In reGharadaghi, Interim Dec. 3001 (BIA 1985); In re Shirdel, Interim Dec. 2958 (BIA1984); In re Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982); cf. Amanullah v. Nelson, No. 86-1604 (1st Cir. Feb 4, 1987); Walai v. INS, 552 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Sarkis v.
Sava, 599 F. Supp. 724, 725 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
157. See discussion and cases cited supra note 156.158. See Walai v. INS, 552 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In Walai, the courtheld that there was no requirement that the INS obtain the permission of the Pakistanigovernment in advance before attempting to remove to Pakistan an Afghani who hadbeen granted withholding of deportation to Afghanistan under § 243(h) of the INA.
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State . " 159
The question of detention of individuals who are "refugees" under
the United Nations Convention and Protocol,16 0 was recently consid-
ered by the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees.161 A working group was set up "with a view
to arriving at a consensus on appropriate conclusions on the subject
of detention .... 162 This working group, while leaving open the
question of a definition of "detention," drafted conclusions which
were adopted by the Executive Committee in its final report.
1 63
The final report of the Executive Committee recognized the
problems caused by individuals who use fraudulent documents or un-
lawful means to enter or attempt to enter another country. The con-
clusions stated that the Executive Committee
[e]xpressed the opinion that in view of the hardship which it involves, de-
tention should normally be avoided. If necessary, detention may be resorted
to only on grounds prescribed by law to verify identity; to determine the
elements on which the claim to refugee status or asylum is based; to deal
with cases where refugees or asylum seekers have destroyed their travel
and/or identity documents or have used fraudulent documents in order to
mislead the authorities of the State in which they intend to claim asylum;
or to protect the national security or public order.""
The Executive Committee further "[r]eaffirmed that refugees and
asylum seekers have duties to the country in which they find them-
selves, which require in particular that they conform to its laws and
regulations as well as to measures taken for the maintenance of pub-
lic order." 165 The government believes that its current detention poli-
cies are consistent with these and the other conclusions of the Execu-
tive Committee.1 68
159. Singh, 623 F. Supp. at 552; see also Ishtyaq v. Sava, 627 F. Supp. 13, 16, 26
(E.D.N.Y. 1983). See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
160. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Report of the
Thirty Seventh Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Pro-
gramme, U.N. Doc. A/AC./688 (1986) [hereinafter Report of the Executive
Committee].
161. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Report of the
Sub-Committee on the Whole on International Protection (Eleventh Meeting), U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 96/685, at 6-9 (1986).
162. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Report of the
Working Group of the Sub-Committee of the Whole on International Protection on the
Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP.2 (XXXVII)/WG/
CRP.1, at 1 (1986).
163. Id. Report of the Executive Committee, supra note 160, at 29-30.
164. Report of the Executive Committee, supra note 162, at 29.
165. Id. at 30.
166. Compare INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, TREATMENT
OF REFUGEES WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE PROBLEM OF DETENTION: 10TH
Detention of Minors
A recent and quite emotional issue is the detention of minors by
the INS. This necessity may arise when minors are apprehended
along with their parents or other adult relatives. An even more diffi-
cult issue arises when "unaccompanied minors" are apprehended
without any parent or responsible adult. 167
The general INS policy is that minors will not be detained in INS
facilities, and that they instead will be placed with appropriate state
or private juvenile facilities.'6 8 The INS generally follows state law
in determining what constitutes a "juvenile."60 As noted earlier in
this Article, juveniles are a category which can be considered for
parole under the INS parole regulations applicable to detained ex-
cludable aliens.170 In 1986 the INS issued a policy statement on the
release of detained juveniles. 71 This policy attempts to minimize the
detention of juveniles, while ensuring that a responsible party prop-
erly will care for each juvenile, and that each juvenile will appear
before the INS when required to do so. 7 2
ROUND TABLE ON CURRENT PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 2,para. 2 (San Remo Sept. 17-20, 1984), with UNITED STATES COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES,
DESPITE A GENEROUS SPIRIT: DENYING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 18-22 (1986).In support of the government's position on detaining asylum applicants who arrive with-
out proper documentation, the First Circuit has recently stated:
If we are to continue to absorb refugees and asylum applicants in meaningful
numbers, both the actuality and the perception of equity must persist: we must
administer them fairly. By the same token, those who wish to make the UnitedStates their home must themselves fairly abide by the system and its proce-dures. Each applicant who puts himself above the law not only jeopardizes theprocess, but also threatens to usurp a place which should be filled by an aspir-ing immigrant who has demonstrated a willingness to play by the rules. Sanc-
tuary cannot be built solidly upon such porous foundations.Amanullah v. Nelson, No. 86-1604, slip. op. at 47 (Ist Cir. Feb. 4, 1987).167. The smuggling of unaccompanied minors into the United States appears to beincreasing. See, e.g., 5-Year-Old Carlos Typifies Growing Border Problem, San Diego
Union, July 24, 1986, at A12, col. 1.168. INS Operations Instruction § 242.6(c) (Nov. 18, 1980); 8 C.F.R. §
212.5(a)(2)(ii) (1986).
169. INS Operations Instruction § 242.6(c) (Nov. 18, 1980); 8 C.F.R. §
212.5(a)(2)(ii) (1986).
170. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(2)(ii). See supra note 47 and accompanying text.171. Memorandum from R. M. Kisor, Associate Commissioner, Enforcement,INS, to Regional Commissioners, concerning Release of Unaccompanied Minors fromService Custody (Mar. 19, 1986) (file CO 242.4-P) (on file with author).
172. Id. The policy statement provides:
The policy of the Service is to minimize the detention of juveniles to the
extent that goal can be attained while protecting the Service from any liabilityfor the release of a juvenile to the custody of a person who does not properly
care for the child, and while ensuring the presence of the child when adminis-
trative proceedings require it. The policy is to err on the side of caution and to
restrict the release of minor to the custody of persons having a legal obligation
to care for the child, those usually being a parent or legal guardian, unless
some other person who seeks custody of the child presents exceptionally com-pelling evidence that he/she will care for the child and will guarantee the
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With regard to the conditions of juvenile detention, facilities used
by the INS are required to meet the same criteria in the areas of
supervision, safety, food service, and medical care, as are local jails
inspected under the INS program previously mentioned. The INS
also is working on additional guidelines for the conditions in juvenile
detention facilities. At the same time, a private organization has un-
dertaken an independent study of problems in child welfare in immi-
gration enforcement with an eye towards offering the INS helpful
suggestions.
Critics of current INS policies claim that the release policy for
juveniles is too restrictive and actually is intended to require parents
of "unaccompanied minors," who may themselves be in the country
illegally, to appear at INS offices where they can be arrested and
processed for deportation. In addition, claims have been made that
the conditions under which juveniles in INS custody are detained do
not meet appropriate legal standards for educational benefits, visita-
tion rights, and separation from adult detainees. A class action suit
on this subject as it pertains to minors detained in the INS Western
Region currently is pending. 17
3
In Perez-Funez v. INS,17 4 allegations were made that the INS had
a policy of coercing unaccompanied minors into accepting voluntary
departure rather than seeking deportation hearings where they could
seek asylum. A preliminary injunction was issued requiring the INS
to give unaccompanied minors under eighteen years of age certain
court-drafted advisals as to the right to a hearing, the ability to be
represented by counsel, and the option of applying for asylum.
Following an extensive trial in Perez-Funez, the court indicated
that the allegations of an INS policy of coercion were unfounded:
child's appearance when required. In view of the Service's difficulty in verifying
assertions a person seeking custody might make in this regard, release to a
person other than a parent or legal guardian is made only in exceptional
circumstances.
The determination whether there are unusual or extraordinary circumstances
is in all locations committed to the discretion of the district director or the
chief patrol agent who supervises the officers having custody of the juveniles.
The determination is made on the particular facts of each case, to the extent
those facts can be ascertained, and has, in past cases, turned on such facts as
the relationship of the proposed custodian to the minor, whether the minor was
ill or pregnant, the availability of detention space, the age of the minor, the
apparent capability and disposition of the proposed custodian to care for the
minor, and the officer's best judgment whether the proposed custodian will as-
sure the appearance of the minor at future deportation proceedings.
173. Flores v. Meese, No. CV-85-4544-RJK (C.D. Cal. filed July 11, 1985).
174. 619 F. Supp. 656 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
One of the plaintiff's principal allegations throughout this litigation hasbeen that the INS engages in a policy of over coercion of unaccompanied
minors that allegedly includes physical mistreatment and verbal abuse.However, this Court has found that allegation to be unfounded. While some
of the class members testified to receiving such mistreatment, the Court
simply does not believe those witnesses on this point. Moreover, the Courtfound the INS' rebuttal testimony on this issue to be credible. Finally, evenif some isolated incidents of mistreatment occurred, these are insufficient tojustify the nationwide injunctive relief plaintiffs seek [citations omitted].Thus, in many ways, the trial vindicated the good faith efforts of the INS[footnote omitted]. This agency performs a thankless task under adverse
conditions and, by and large, performs it admirably."75
The court, however, concluded that the processing environment for
unaccompanied minors was inherently coercive and therefore vio-
lated due process, notwithstanding the absence of any wrongdoing by
the INS. The INS procedures made efforts to locate an appropriate
representative (parent, relative, friend, or appropriate consular of-
ficer) before offering voluntary departure without a deportation
hearing to an alien under the age of fourteen. Reduced efforts to
locate appropriate representatives were made for fourteen through
sixteen year old aliens. Their voluntary departure requests usually
were honored without consultation with an adult. Different proce-
dures applied to Canadian and Mexican juveniles apprehended in
the immediate border area.
The court found that juveniles under and over age fourteen were
generally incapable of understanding their rights, and therefore
might be making uninformed decisions regarding the waiver of im-
portant rights. 176 The court directed the parties to prepare a simpli-
fied rights advisal to be given to the minors. The court also con-
cluded that certain subclasses had different due process needs. For
unaccompanied minors apprehended in the vicinity* of the border
who reside permanently in Canada or Mexico, the needs were deter-
mined to be less. In addition to the simplified advisal, the INS is
required, prior to presenting the voluntary departure form, to inform
such a class member of the opportunity to make a call to a parent,
close relative, friend, or organization on the INS free legal serviceslist.'"7
The court determined that all other unaccompanied minors were
in need of greater protections. For these minors, the court required
the INS to provide access to telephones and to make its best efforts
to ensure that the minor in fact has communicated, by telephone or
otherwise, with a parent, close adult relative, friend, or organization
found on the INS free legal services list.178 Although the government
175. Id. at 661.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 670.
178. Id.
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disagreed with the reasoning of the district court, no appeal was
taken, and the injunction entered by the district court has become
permanent.
Conditions of Release
Section 242(a) of the INA provides, in part, that release of a de-
portable alien may be under bond of not less than 500 dollars "con-
taining such conditions as the Attorney General may prescribe. ' 17 9
The INS has interpreted such language as authorizing the placing of
a "no-work" condition upon the release on bond of deportable
aliens. 180
The issue of the no-work bond condition first reached the Board of
Immigration Appeals in 1972. In a 3-2 decision, the Board found
that the INA granted no authority for such a condition. That deci-
sion was certified by the Board to the Attorney General for review.
In a 1974 decision, In re Toscano-Rivas,18' the Attorney General
disagreed with the Board's reasoning, and concurred only in the re-
sult reached, invalidating the particular employment condition in
question.
After reviewing the legislative history of the INA, the Attorney
General concluded that Congress had given the Attorney General
wide discretion to impose bond conditions related to the various pur-
poses of the immigration laws. The Attorney General found that "a
basic purpose of the immigration laws is to protect against the dis-
placement of workers in the United States." 182 Therefore, the Attor-
ney General concluded:
The pertinent statutory provisions authorize, in at least some circumstances,
the inclusion in appearance-and-delivery bonds of conditions which bar un-
authorized employment. However, the use of such conditions should be spe-
cifically governed by a published regulation of the Service. Because no such
regulation exists, the result reached by a majority of the Board should be
sustained. 83
179. INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
180. Certain cases of significant importance may be referred to the Attorney Gen-
eral for review of the Board's decision and the entry of a final decision by the Attorney
General. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h). Such referral may take place at the request of the Attorney
General, the Board, or the Commissioner of the INS. Id. In this case, the majority of the
Board voted to refer the decision to the Attorney General for review. See In re Toscano-
Rivas, 14 I. & N. Dec. 523, 550 (BIA 1973; A.G. 1974). Referral to the Attorney Gen-
eral is rare. In recent years, such referrals on the average have been made in less than
one case per year.
181. In re Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. Dec. 523 (BIA 1972, 1973; A.G. 1974).
182. Id. at 555.
183. Id. at 553.
Following Toscano-Rivas, the INS promulgated regulations al-
lowing the imposition of no-work bond riders, and setting forth fac-
tors to be considered in determining whether such riders were appro-
priate. "8 However, such riders required the approval of the
appropriate INS regional commissioner. Another decision of the
Board set forth detailed evidentiary requirements for the imposition
of such riders.18 5
Because of these constraints, no-work riders were used on a rela-
tively infrequent basis. In addition, there was a lack of consistency
between the no-work riders and the INS regulations18" pertaining to
grants of employment authorization. It was possible, and happened
quite frequently, that an alien would be released without a no-work
rider being imposed, but that the alien would not necessarily be eligi-
ble to receive employment authorization under INS regulations.
Such aliens would be neither forbidden nor authorized by the INS to
accept employment.
In 1983 the INS attempted through rulemaking to close this gap
and to make no-work riders more usable and consistent with the
work authorization regulations. Following the publication of a notice
of proposed rulemaking,18 7 a final rule was published, effective De-
cember 7, 1983.188 This rule delegated authority to impose no-work
riders to INS district directors and provided that a condition barring
unauthorized employment "shall be included in an appearance and
delivery bond in connection with deportation proceeding(s) or bond
posted for the release of an alien in exclusion proceedings, unless the
District Director determines that employment is appropriate."' 189
A number of criteria were set forth for use in determining whether
employment was appropriate, including possible eligibility for immi-
gration benefits and the necessity for supporting a United States citi-
zen or lawful permanent resident spouse or children. 190 Any individ-
ual for whom a no-work rider was found inappropriate specifically
would be authorized to accept employment, thus eliminating the pre-
vious "limbo" status."91
A class action suit was filed challenging the revised regulations on
a number of grounds. Following the grant of a preliminary injunc-
184. 39 Fed. Reg. 19,201 (May 31, 1974) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 103.6).
185. In re Leon-Perez, 15 1. & N. Dec. 239 (BIA 1975) (superseded by regulation
as stated in In re Shoen, Interim Dec. 2977 (BIA 1984)).
186. 8 C.F.R. § 109.1 (1986).
187. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed. Reg. 8820 (1983) (codified at 8
C.F.R. §§ 103-6, 109.1) (proposed Mar. 2, 1983).
188. 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142 (Nov. 7, 1983) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2),
109.1(b)(2)).
189. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(ii) (1986).
190. Id. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii).
191. Id. § 109.1(b)(8).
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tion, a district court concluded that no-work riders were beyond the
statutory authority of the Attorney General.192 This ruling was af-
firmed by the Ninth Circuit on appeal. 193
The Ninth Circuit found that the Attorney General's discretion to
impose release conditions must be limited to those conditions which
are related to securing the alien's presence during the deportation
process. The court rejected the government's argument that the con-
dition was justified by the need to protect American labor, finding
that the Act showed no more than a "peripheral concern" by the
Congress with the employment of illegal aliens. 94
Somewhat incongruously, the Ninth Circuit cited the case-by-case
no-work rider determinations required by previous INS regula-
tions.195 The court stated: "The peripheral concern of the Act with
the employment of illegal aliens is not sufficient to support the impo-
sition of a no-employment condition in every bond."' 196 To the extent
that this may suggest that individualized no-work riders are permis-
sible, it seems inconsistent with the court's conclusion that no-work
riders are beyond the statutory authority of the Attorney General.
As a result of the court's decision, the INS was barred from impos-
ing any no-work riders.197
Detainers
One of the most confusing areas of INS detention law involves the
use of INS detainers lodged against potentially deportable aliens
who are serving criminal sentences in local, state, or federal penal
institutions. Frequently, the result of such a detainer is that the pe-
nal authorities deny the alien participation in certain vocational or
192. National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. CV 83-7927-KN
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1986).
193. National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. INS, 644 F. Supp. 5 (C.D.
Cal. 1985), affid, 791 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded for further
consideration in light of IRCA, 107 S. Ct. 1881 (1987).
194. Id. at 1355-56. On November 6, 1986, Congress passed IRCA, see supra note
8. Section 101 of that Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324A) specifically provides civil
and criminal sanctions for the unlawful employment of aliens. The court's conclusions
seem especially inappropriate in light of the new law.
195. National Center, 791 F.2d at 1355-56.
196. Id. at 1356.
197. Cf. In re Shuen, Interim Dec. 2977 (BIA May 25, 1984 & Sept. 7, 1984)
(preliminary injunction barring enforcement of new bond regulations does not automati-
cally revive the previous version of those regulations). The Supreme Court recently
granted the government's petition for certiorari, vacating and remanding National
Center to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of the enactment of IRCA.
See supra note 193.
work-release programs for which the alien otherwise might be
eligible.
A number of such detainees have attempted to get the INS to set
a bond which they believe would convince the penal authorities to
allow them to participate in the programs. However, the Board has
concluded that because such detainees are not in the actual physical
custody of the INS, the district director lacked jurisdiction to con-
sider the respondent's application for bond or its equivalent.198 This
position has been sustained by the courts.19
In one case, the Seventh Circuit held that an INS civil detainer is
not a detainer within the meaning of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers, because no criminal charges are involved in the INS de-
tainer.200 Thus an alien cannot rely on the Interstate Agreement
upon Detainers, nor can he rely upon the Speedy Trial Act, in re-
questing a speedy disposition of the underlying deportation
charges. 201 Nevertheless, the court noted that section 242(a) of the
INA implicitly requires the Department of Justice to proceed with
reasonable dispatch to determine deportability once deportation pro-
ceedings have been instituted. 202 However, a district court recently
concluded that an incarcerated alien had no right to an expeditious
hearing because he was not being detained in INS custody and he
had no statutory or constitutional right to participate in any pro-
grams which might be adversely affected by the INS detainer. 20 3
The INS does not always serve an order to show cause commenc-
ing deportation proceedings on an alien subject to a detainer. The
order to show cause may be issued when the alien actually is re-
leased to the physical custody of the INS. As a practical matter, the
EOIR currently does not have the ability to assign immigrationjudges to hear cases in all prisons where potentially deportable incar-
cerated aliens are located. This is especially apparent in light of the
fact that as many as 18,000 to 20,000 INS detainers may be out-
standing at any one time.20 '
198. In re Lehder, 15 I. & N. Dec. 159 (BIA 1975).
199. See, e.g., Fernandez-Collado v. INS, 644 F. Supp. 741 (D. Conn. 1986); Vil-
legas-Gomez v. INS, No. 86-1057-CIV-SCOTT (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 1986); Velasco v.
INS, No. 85-1999-JV (D. Or. Oct. 12, 1986).
200. Argiz v. United States Immigration, 704 F.2d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 1983).
201. Id. at 387-88.
202. Id. at 388-89. The district court had ruled that under section 242(a) of the
INA, the Attorney General was required to commence deportation proceedings within 90
days. Id. at 386 nn.1 & 2. This issue was not raised on appeal.
203. Fernandez-Collado v. INS, 644 F. Supp. 741 (D. Conn. 1986); accord Ville-
gas-Gomez v. INS, No. 86-1057-CIV-SCOTT (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 1986). See generally
Moody v. Deggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976).
204. In fiscal year 1985 over 42,000 criminal aliens were referred to the INS for
investigation by various law enforcement agencies. INS, Investigations Division, A Re-
port to the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, at 23 (Sept. 1, 1986).
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Issues involving INS detainers are likely to become even more sig-
nificant in the future as the result of the enactment in 1986 of sev-
eral new statutory provisions dealing with criminal alien felons. As
part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA),20 5 Congress has made the federal government potentially
financially responsible for the costs incurred by states for the incar-
ceration of convicted Mariel Cubans and certain other illegal aliens.
Another section of IRCA mandates that "[iun the case of an alien
who is convicted of an offense which makes the alien subject to de-
portation, the Attorney General shall begin any deportation proceed-
ing as expeditiously as possible after the date of conviction." 208 In
order to carry out this provision, the Act authorizes (but does not
appropriate) additional funding for the EOIR for fiscal years 1987
and 1988, presumably for the hiring of more immigration judges.207
Another recent enactment, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,208
requires that federal, state, and local law enforcement officials who
arrest an alien for a violation of any law relating to controlled sub-
stances must expeditiously notify the INS if they believe that alien is
unlawfully present in the United States. In such situations, the INS
must expeditiously determine whether to place a detainer on the
alien, and must take custody of the alien if such alien is not other-
wise detained by the other law enforcement agency involved.209 The
law also directs the Attorney General to establish a pilot program in
four cities to improve the computer capability of the INS and local
law enforcement agencies to respond to inquiries concerning aliens
who may have violated controlled substances laws.2 10
Taken together, these new provisions should result in more refer-
205. IRCA § 501(b), 100 Stat. at 3443. The payment of such reimbursement is
"[s]ubject to the amounts provided in advance in Appropriation Acts." Since no such
appropriation has yet been made, no money currently is available for reimbursement.
206. Id. § 701, 100 Stat. at 3345 (adding/amending INA § 242). A district court
recently held that this provision required cancellation of an INS detainer on a criminal
alien unless the INS executed the detainer by initiating deportation within 60 days.
Gomez v. Sullivan, No. 5-86-306 (D. Minn. April 7, 1987).
207. Id. § 111(b)(2), 100 Stat. at 3381.
208. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1751(d), 100 Stat.
3207, 3207-47, 48 (1986) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d)). The same section also
amends the exclusion and deportation provisions of the INA § 212(a)(23), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(23), and INA § 241(a)(1 1), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1 1), to conform exclusion and
deportation on drug-related grounds to the definitions contained in the Controlled Sub-
stances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802. Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 1751(a), (b), (c), 100 Stat. at
3207-47.
209. Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 1751(d), 100 Stat. at 3207-47, 48.
210. Id. § 1751(e)(1), 100 Stat. at 3207-48.
rals of criminal aliens to the INS and more detainers on aliens in
non-INS custody being lodged by the INS. In addition, there will be
more pressure on immigration judges to visit penal institutions for
the purpose of holding hearings for incarcerated illegal aliens, in or-
der to expedite the removal of such aliens, and to reduce the poten-
tial federal financial liability.
The Future of Detention
Regardless of the legal parameters of INS detention authority, the
fact remains that while the INS has apprehended well over one mil-
lion undocumented aliens in each of the past several years," the
number of detention spaces available has never exceeded four thou-
sand. Even assuming that IRCA results in an increase in INS deten-
tion capabilities, the vast majority of undocumented aliens appre-
hended in the United States will not spend any substantial amount
of time in INS detention.
A danger exists that the disparity between apprehensions and
available detention space will lead to arbitrariness in the use of de-
tention. This raises the question of how the INS most effectively and
fairly can utilize its detention authority and capacity.
One suggestion is utilizing detention space to concentrate on the
cases of aliens who have final orders of exclusion or deportation,
rather than utilizing the space for pre-hearing detention or detention
during the hearing process. This would help the INS to solve one of
its most vexing problems: the lack of ability to actually remove
aliens who have gone all the way through the process and lost. Also,
by concentrating on aliens who have completed at least the adminis-
trative process, the length of detention would be reduced and some
of the legal arguments regarding detention of asylum applicants and
other groups would be avoided.
To some extent, the INS already is moving in this direction. Re-
cently published final rules have amended the regulations to elimi-
nate the previous seventy-two hour "run letters" to aliens for whom
final orders of deportation are outstanding.212 Under the new rules,
211. In fiscal year 1983 the INS apprehended 1,251,357 aliens. In fiscal year 1984
the INS apprehended 1,246,981 aliens. In fiscal year 1985, the INS apprehended
1,348,749 aliens. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
1985 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 176(1986). In fiscal year 1986, INS apprehensions rose to a record 1,770,000. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Press Release, Sept. 29, 1986. Recently, INS apprehensions have dropped signifi-
cantly. See supra note 8.
212. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,041 (1986) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 243.3). The so-
called "run letter" was a notification to an alien to surrender for deportation, served on
an alien at least 72 hours prior to the scheduled deportation. According to a 1984 INS
study cited in the notice of proposed rulemaking, "76 percent of those aliens ordered to
surrender fail to do so, many of them after lengthy appellate procedures that have been
resolved in favor of the Service." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 51 Fed. Reg. 3471
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arrest and detention of those subject to removal under warrants of
deportation will become the norm.213
Critics of INS policies can be expected to claim that by concen-
trating on aliens with final orders of deportation, the INS is attempt-
ing to cut off last-minute access to the courts. However, the current
rules make it clear that no alien can be removed from the United
States until at least seventy-two hours have elapsed since the service
of the final decision in the case, during which time he can attempt to
obtain a stay of deportation or to pursue any available judicial or
administrative remedies.214
From the INS standpoint, to the extent that concentrating on
post-hearing detention may reduce detention space for pre-hearing
cases, it might be perceived as lessening the deterrent value that de-
tention might have on those aliens who seek to come to the United
States without any plausible claims for admissibility, simply to work
and improve their economic status while here illegally. On the other
hand, ensuring removal of deportable aliens can be perceived as cre-
ating a type of integrity for the hearing process that does not now
exist.215
The enactment of IRCA also will have an impact on the future of
detention. To the extent that the employer sanctions provisions of
IRCA21 6 are successful, it should be more difficult for aliens who are
not authorized to work in the United States to utilize delay in the
deportation hearing process for the purpose of obtaining employment
while in the United States. Moreover, the previously-mentioned em-
phasis217 of IRCA and the Anti-Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1986
on criminal aliens, with particular attention to alien drug offenders,
indicates that future INS interior enforcement efforts will concen-
(1986) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 243.3).
213. 8 C.F.R. § 243.3(a) (1986), amended by 51 Fed. Reg. 23,041 (1986). See
supra note 212. An exception to the general rule of custody pending execution of the
final order is set forth for those same categories of aliens who would be eligible for parole
in an exclusion situation, as described in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a). For a description of those
categories, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
214. 8 C.F.R. § 243.3(b), amended by 51 Fed. Reg. 23,041 (1986). The alien may
request a waiver of this 72-hour period.
215. As previously discussed, see supra note 212, an INS study shows that over
three-quarters of all aliens ordered to surrender for deportation failed to do so. Although
INS attorneys completed over 86,000 cases during fiscal year 1985, only 20,560 aliens
actually were deported in that year. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATURALI-
ZATION SERVICE, 1985 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZA-
TION SERVICE 195 (1986).
216. IRCA § 101a, 100 Stat. at 3360 (amending/adding INA § 274A).
217. See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
trate on criminal aliens, along with employment-related enforce-
ment. The availability of adequate space to detain criminal aliens
pending removal from the country will likely be a high priority for
the INS. The provisions of IRCA which authorize a fifty percent
increase in the size of the INS Border Patrol will result in more
detention resources being utilized in border areas.2 18 Additionally,
IRCA specifically directs the Secretary of Defense "to provide the
Attorney General with a list of facilities of the Department of De-
fense that could be made available to the Bureau of Prisons for use
in incarcerating aliens who are subject to exclusion or deportation
from the United States."' 1 9
Finally, there is always the possibility of future legislative change.
A so-called "INS Efficiency Bill" which was actually passed by the
House of Representatives during the closing days of the 99th Con-
gress, contained some significant revisions in detention authority.2 0
That bill would have required that the Attorney General release
both excludable and deportable aliens, under appropriate conditions,
unless the Attorney General had reason to believe that a particular
alien (1) would pose a danger to other persons or the community; (2)
had committed certain criminal or subversive acts or had engaged in
the persecution of others; (3) was subject to exclusion or deportation
on certain grounds relating to subversion and national security; (4)
had violated previous conditions of release; or (5) was likely to ab-
scond. 21 Such legislation would eliminate the basic difference in the
standard for detaining excludable, as opposed to deportable,
aliens.222
CONCLUSION
The legal authority of the INS to detain aliens is well established.
Barring any legislative changes, it can be expected to remain so. Re-
cent legislation has not affected the legal authority to detain, and
can be expected to result in increased use of detention in cases of
criminal aliens and to promote border control.
The exact parameters and limits of INS authority, however, have
not been as clearly defined by either statute or judicial ruling. The
INS has developed, or is in the process of developing, standards in a
number of areas to carry out its detention responsibilities in the most
enlightened and uniform way possible. Nevertheless, it can be antici-
pated that various advocacy groups will continue to believe that INS
218. IRCA § II1(b), 100 Stat. at 3381.
219. Id. § 702, 100 Stat. at 3445.
220. H.R. 4823, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 311 (passed by the House of Representa-
tives, Sept. 29, 1986).
221. Id. §§ 311(a), (b).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 10-64.
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efforts have not gone far enough, and will press for more judicial
intervention and definition in the area. Ultimately, such questions
are likely to require at least some resolution at the Supreme Court
level.
Immigration detention has taken on a symbolic significance. Advo-
cates of stronger immigration controls view the level of INS deten-
tion as an indication of the government's commitment to strong im-
migration law enforcement. Conversely, those who generally believe
in less restrictive immigration policies view detention as indicative of
an overall harshness caused by immigration laws.
It is obvious that no immigration control system could function
with a complete absence of immigration detention. It is equally obvi-
ous that no rational immigration system could, or should, detain all
illegal aliens. The challenge for the government is to chart a middle
course: to use detention in a humane and rational manner that pro-
motes the effective enforcement of the immigration laws, while es-
chewing overuse of detention which is both counterproductive and
costly.

